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1 Introduction
It is not such a long time ago since ‘40 years’ was
the average life expectancy of a human being
anywhere in the world, and under different historical
circumstances we might have gathered for a funeral
mass or remembrance ceremony rather than to
celebrate a fortieth anniversary. But the relentless
pace of human progress on all fronts during the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries mean that
longer average life expectancies have emerged as the
norm and it appears to be almost within our grasp to
master disease and poverty.
And yet, it is one of the supreme ironies of our
times that, because of in-built unevenness and
imbalances in the human quest for progress, we still
find ourselves caught in a world of sharp contrasts
that add up to diminish our collective achievements.
Thus, while in one part of the world one of the key
challenges arising is the problem of ageing
populations; in another part of the same world, the
part that constitutes the global South and within
which Africa is nested, one of the biggest problems
centres on the falling average life expectancies for a
significant number, and a population that is
overwhelmingly youthful in profile.
Depending, therefore, on the part of the world in
which we find ourselves, reaching the age of 40
could convey very different meanings: the beginning
of the end or the end of the beginning – or even a
grey zone between the two.
2 Trajectories of development
Taking a longer historical view, we might conclude
that the high hopes raised by the seemingly
relentless pace of progress made the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries the heyday of
development. Prometheus seemed truly to be
unbound and, to reiterate a metaphor coined by Leo
Huberman (founder of Monthly Review), man’s
worldly goods accumulated in leaps and bounds, and
the promise of a better life was in the air.
It was in the name of this progress, ideologised into
a civilising mission and the white man’s burden, that
Europe was to pursue foreign conquests and
colonies, radically redrawing the map of the modern
world according to its image and interests. I shall
return later to the implications of this flipside of
progress. Still, it bears pointing out at this point that
even within the colonial project, especially in the
postwar period, there was what Anne Phillips
referred to in her 1989 book, The Enigma of
Colonialism, as the ideology of development, an
ideology that was born of structural and conjunctural
factors that need not detain us here. It was in this
immediate postwar period that President Truman
launched his ‘development era’.
It was also in this context that development research
and studies as a distinct field began to emerge,
combining concerns about how wealth can be
created and sustained at ever higher levels with an
active interest in understanding why poverty persists
and how it might be overcome. Economics was the
privileged discipline for this task and there were
important intellectual investments made in the
evolution of a sub-field or sub-discipline of
development economics. But economics was far
from being alone – anthropology, sociology,
geography, political science, history and international
relations all joined in the fray, drawing from their
different disciplinary perspectives to feed the debates
that became the stuff of development research.
Thanks to the contributions of development
researchers, the conceptual distinction between
growth and development was gradually established
and a new consensus agreed that, although
development cannot occur without growth, unless
interventionist measures are introduced, growth can
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never on its own serve as a sufficient condition for
development. Arguments raged about the conditions
that make growth possible, the prerequisites for
translating growth into development and the
strategies for sustaining development. Uniformly,
policy was to settle for an answer that called for
infusions of foreign capital in the form of loans and
aid. The possibilities of the transfer of knowledge
and technology were explored. This was the standard
response for bridging the growing global divide, and
soon an aid industry was to boom.
The notion of development itself, often overlapping
with a sense of progress, was to undergo considerable
refining, going beyond wealth creation and wealth
distribution to encompass leisure, happiness, gender
equality, environmental sustainability, intergenerational
socioeconomic rights, etc. The gradual expansion of the
notion of the development to incorporate these issues
– contested in some circles – both reflected and
interfaced with a feeling of unease that although
humankind was, on aggregate, registering great
progress, that greatness was also being diminished by
the numerous dysfunctionalities that were in evidence.
Of the dysfunctionalities that were identified as making
development less robust than it should be, none
focused our attention more than the North–South or
centre–periphery asymmetries that appeared to be
worsening in the 1960s and 1970s and which were
used by the underdevelopment/dependency school to
challenge the various strands of modernisation theory
that had, hitherto, been dominant, and which had their
specific disciplinary expressions.
The question that was posed could be summarised
very simply as follows: Why was one half of the
world registering development and the other half
not? Was the development of the one half that was
progressing occurring at the expense of the other
half that appeared to be stagnating? Why were
some countries so hopelessly dependant on others?
Views were varied on these questions and the answers
proffered displayed differing degrees of nuance. But
although the underdevelopment/dependency school
had many weaknesses, perhaps its single most
important contribution was to challenge the idea most
widely expressed in the Rostowian five stages of
economic growth that developing countries were
condemned to follow the exact paths that had been
trodden decades earlier by the developed countries in
order to progress.
Thus the end of the age of innocence in the
development debate was first signalled by this
success of the underdevelopment/dependency
school. It projected the concerns of the developing
countries onto an international developmental
architecture that was underpinned by power
relations that didn’t give them much of a fighting
chance. Mainstream development research was seen
as predominantly irrelevant at best and obstructive at
worse, promoting arguments which seemed
weighted in favour of the preservation of a status quo
that was neither tenable nor sustainable.
Politicians and policymakers in developing countries
seized the moment to push for a new international
order that would be fairer to all. Their campaigns
were to be joined by a variety of interests, ranging
from environmentalists, gender/feminist activists and
trade unionists seeking to expand labour rights,
among others. These campaigns established a notion
of development that was tied to the radical
transformation of the status quo. Such concepts as
‘Another Development’ (particularly popular in the
Nordic countries) came to the fore in discussions of a
new world order. Other notions emerged, like
sustainable development, a forerunner to human
development, and Schumacher’s ‘small is beautiful’/
‘small is possible’.
In this context, the business of development was
increasingly seen as going way beyond the concerns
of high-minded aid workers or innocent Peace Corps
volunteers to speak more boldly and directly to
rooting out the structural foundations of
underdevelopment, or mal-development as some put
it. The time for mere palliatives to cushion the
problems of the poor seemed to be over. Social
movements for local and global change flourished in
this framework, expounding projects of social
transformation. Solidarity in action was their
watchword, and in its name they called on
transnational corporations to be more accountable.
But looking back at the powerful forces with which
the new international order movement was in
confrontation, one may be tempted to think of that
era as a somewhat romantic one that did not
sufficiently reckon with what it would take to
dislodge entrenched interests. The reliance on the
United Nations system to push the frontiers of
change came up against the constraints of inter-state
diplomacy. Social movements sown from below
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sought change through an umbrella framework
constructed from above.
The economic and political contexts of the quest for
a new order was to be changed radically by the oil
shocks of the 1970s, the final death of the gold
standard, the decline of Keynesianism in domestic
policymaking and the rise of conservative regimes in
the key centres of global accumulation – the USA,
the UK, Germany and Canada. The collapse of the
Soviet Union and the system it had spawned in
Eastern Europe and the end of the Cold War
completed the cycle of change.
The shift that occurred took place alongside the rise
of a neoliberal ideology that had been in the making
since the early 1970s, and which took a hegemonic
position on economic questions. Where Keynesians
saw employment generation as a key concern for
policymaking, the neoliberals defined inflation as
public enemy No 1. Where Keynesians recognised
market imperfections or incompleteness and thus
saw an active role for public policymaking via the
state, the neoliberals proclaimed the evilness, or
wickedness and inefficiency of the state, which they
contrasted to perfect and efficient markets.
Yesterday’s public enterprises, including those that
emerged from nationalisation, were earmarked for
privatisation. Whatever was left in the public domain
was to be subjected to a market logic.
Development concerns that appeared to be settled at
the core of the post-1945 Keynesian world were
mercilessly assaulted and relegated to the
background. As to the champions of a new world
order, the neoliberals found no time of the day for
them: the new name of the game was a free and
open market. No wonder some commentators were
to say that the neoliberal onslaught was nothing
short of a counter-revolution which turned settled
ideas on their head and proclaimed the birth of a
bold new era. The TINA ideology (Margaret Thatcher’s
famous ‘there is no alternative’) was proclaimed and
conditionality was deployed to deliver compliance
among developing countries. International financial
institutions born out of Keynesian ideals were
hijacked by the neoliberals and transformed into the
omnipotent enforcers of the new market orthodoxy.
Emboldened by the support of key developed
country governments, and spurred by initial successes
in taming rampaging inflation in the leading OECD
economies, the neoliberals were to proclaim two
victories: the death of inflation and the death of
development. As we know, this turned out to be a
rather premature victory cry, but while it lasted it
had many development researchers scrambling for
cover and adopting the new orthodoxy for various
reasons, including the fear of irrelevance.
But in its theoretical underpinnings and in its practice,
neoliberalism was replete with contradictions. These
contradictions have been detailed by several scholars
well known to us, – Jomo Kwame Sundaran, Ha Joon
Chang, Joseph Stiglitz and Finn Tarp, to name a few.
The contradictions of the neoliberal agenda added up
to ensure that it was never able to deliver on most of
its promises. In serving as the ideological underbelly
for a market-driven process of globalisation, it opened
new problems and compounded existing ones.
Inequalities at various levels re-asserted themselves
with a vengeance and local social dislocations
accompanied them, resonating on a global scale.
In the face of the failures of the neoliberal agenda, the
self-assured confidence of its frontline ideologues was
eventually tempered and the Bretton Woods
institutions that, a decade earlier, had been
reconfigured to serve as the prime enforcers of the
narrow market orthodoxy became more humble as the
growing calls for a new post-Washington consensus
framework became too loud to ignore. By the end of
the 1990s, neoliberalism had been backed into a corner
– but it was far from defeated. For while there was a
consensus that neoliberal policies were problematic,
several factors prevented the emergence of credible
alternatives that could transcend them, Thus, new
policy interventions, such as the Poverty Reduction
Strategy Papers, continued to be underpinned by
neoliberal macroeconomic assumptions that rendered
them counter-productive. Part of the explanation for
this must lie in the stars of development research that
seem to have led us into a dead-end.
This is roughly where we find ourselves today. We
entered the new millennium with more questions
than ever, questions that are complicated by the
discontents and asymmetries of a neoliberal orthodoxy
that created domestic and global maladjustments.
The harvest from maladjustment is plentiful: migration
driven by want and hopelessness, the xenophobic
reactions it tends to generate and the fortress solutions
that are proposed; the collapse of central governmental
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authority, especially in Africa; uncontrolled urbanisation;
de-agrarianisation which has gone hand-in-hand with
de-industrialisation in some places; the collapse in
others of the middle classes and, with their decline, the
collapse of the middle ground in politics; the increasing
burden placed on large numbers of women and the
widening of gender inequalities; the spread of human
trafficking. Extremes of various kinds, fundamentalisms
of various shades compete with criminality and the
deployment of extreme violence. Extreme wealth and
poverty stand face-to-face in a confrontation that
constantly threatens a breakdown of order. 
Of course, not all countries and regions of the world
have felt the impact of maladjustment to the same
degree and not all have displayed the same degree
of incapacity to work with and overcome its effects.
Indeed, some have been able to adapt themselves in
order to fill niches arising from maladjustment and
the global re-ordering which is being engineered. At
one end of the problem of maladjustment, the
receiving end, stands Africa; at the other end, the
gaining end, stands China as a symbol of the shifts in
the redistribution of power that is going on and
from which India is also benefiting. Still, because of
the closer integration of the world economy, it is
safe to assume that all countries and fiscal actors will
feel the effects of maladjustment.
Tomorrow’s historians may well look back on this era
and conclude that, as with the crisis of the early
twentieth century, especially the depression of the
interwar years, and America’s rise following the
Second World War, which shifted the locus of global
power away from Europe and served as the context
for the consolidation of the American century, we
may be witnessing the beginnings of another shift,
this time eastwards with China at its epicentre and
India and other emergent players in its outer circles.
Shifts of this nature come with their own anxieties,
even discontents: multilayered uncertainties about
jobs that might be lost in some places, industrial
sectors that might be wiped out, social welfare
systems that will be eroded – the list is not
exhaustive. History teaches us that no socioeconomic
change of the magnitude that is currently taking
place passes without friction and a global
realignment of forces and interests will underpin the
new balance of power that will emerge. This time
too, it is accompanied by new democratic pressures
and citizen concerns for a greater say.
That is why questions are being asked around the
world about what the Chinese age will mean for
other players in the development game: Will China
be a benign or hegemonic power? What
opportunities will the Chinese age create for some
and which doors will close for others? The questions
are many and the answers are still largely speculative.
Between the lingering effects of neoliberal
adjustment and the challenges which the rise of
China poses – political, economic, social,
environmental and cultural, development research
clearly has its work cut out. The question is: are we
equipped for the intellectual challenges that arise?
3 The challenges for development research
I would suggest that our capacity to rise to the
challenges posed by the changing global and local
contexts of development will depend on our
willingness to reinvent ourselves constantly in order
to become more adequate for the tasks at hand.
Further, we cannot reinvent successfully without
addressing some of the key weaknesses that marred
our previous efforts at contributing, through
knowledge production, to the goal of securing
human welfare, freedom and happiness in an
environment of peace and democracy.
The first of the weaknesses that must be overcome
is connected to the weight which the origins of
development research, as we came to know it, bears
on the trade. As with Area Studies in the USA,
development research emerged out of the needs of
powerful policy interests in the period of late
colonialism. These origins meant that development
research was from its very beginnings a discussion
about the other. This may not necessarily have been a
bad thing in and of itself except that the discourse
became, effectively, how to make the developing
countries become like the developed countries.
In this framework, the development problems of the
developed countries were never sufficiently engaged
and the development problems of the developing
countries were read through the prism of the history
of the developed countries. That history was itself so
highly sanitised so as to empty it of contestation and
contradiction. Idealised versions of the history of
development in the West were produced against
which the experiences of the developing countries
were measured. Factors that acted as triggers were
presented as undisputed historical fact. And yet, in
internal discussions in the Western academy, these
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factors and the importance of each of them continues
to be the object of debate, as indeed they should be.
Effectively, two parallel discussions were taking
place: one preoccupied with development in the
West and the other, Western-driven that drew in a
stylised, unproblematised fashion from the historical
experiences of the West, to interpret and pronounce
on development in the South. In the end, although
Rostow may have been an extreme example of this
approach, he was by no means an exception.
Failing to relate adequately to the internal dynamics
of the developing countries and the historical
contexts that shape them, development research
tended to be ahistorical and was carried out by
analogy. Unilinear evolutionism was rampant. In
policy terms, it reduced the practice of development
in much of the South to an exercise in mimicry. Aid
dependency and massive extremes and debt burden
were the inevitable outcome.
This approach to development research did not go
unchallenged and a significant number of critics
were attempted to contest the validity of the
pathologies which allegedly set developing countries
apart from the developed countries. In the same
vein, the predilection to characterise similar
processes differently was questioned. We need to
evolve a unified development discourse underpinned
by solid comparative methods and not simple
analogies. We cannot continue to read the histories
of the South through the histories of the North.
A second related weakness has to do with the failure
to engage with the intellectual production of the
countries whose experiences are being studied. In
place of such an engagement, local knowledge from
the West is hegemonised and presented as universally
valid. This may partly explain why we have been too
quick to look for formulaic solutions to problems that
do not lend themselves easily to such approaches.
Third, and too frequently we have resorted to
employing binary frames to dichotomise complex
realities, with the consequence that we lose the
nuance and expunge the messy bits that are as
important for a proper understanding of the
processes we seek to study. Evolving a unified
discourse is not to encourage the idea of a one-size-
fits-all model of development thinking. One of the
challenges which we currently face is the need to
rediscover our capacities to study development in its
pluralism and diversity, also tapping into the history
and cultural contexts of different peoples. No two
routes to development are the same and the margins
for choice in the policy process must be defended.
As I noted earlier, development research and
development cooperation have a long history of
association which may not necessarily be unhealthy.
However, in funding development research, the policy
community has also appropriated a greater role for
itself in setting the pace and choosing what is studied
– and even, at times, how it is studied. In its worst
form, this has made development research appear to
be the voicepiece of development cooperation. But it
has also meant as rapid a turnover of agenda as
fashions in development cooperation change. Is this
not the reason why some critics have worried aloud
that development research is now increasingly about
buzz words and fads at the altar of which patient,
longitudinal research is sacrificed?
Furthermore, the concepts we use to try to capture
the realities we confront have become increasingly
inadequate. This much was registered by the report
of the Gulbenkian Commission on the restructuring
of social sciences which Wellerstein chaired. It is true
that development research at its best is
multidisciplinary. But in its multidisciplinarity, it is still
disproportionally driven by specific disciplinary
anchors that make an integrated discourse difficult.
Yet, the business of development, inscribed as it is in
history, culture, psychology, geography and
environment, cannot be grasped fully if caged within
specific disciplinary boundaries.
If development research is to be meaningful and
relevant, we need to invest more in multidisciplinary
approaches that are capable of generating new,
commonly shared concepts that better enable us to
capture the many types and layers and boundaries
that define modern livelihoods.
In light of this, it will also be important to challenge
the hegemony of orthodox macroeconomics and the
pressure other disciplines feel to mimic its methods
and adopt its assumptions. The social science roots
of development research and its qualitative tools
must not be sacrificed but should be rediscovered.
Above all, the desire for technical solutions to
development problems, while useful when properly
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placed in context, sometimes take on a life of its
own with the consequence that we forget that
development is about people and that what they
think and how they feel matters. The Millennium
Development Goals (MDGs) may be lofty in their
ambitions, but set in a technocratic mould, they play
down the realities of unequal power relations that
continue to rule the world economy and which
make the question of global economic and political
governance an urgent one to which development
researchers must pay close attention.
Over the last 40 years, IDS has been successful in
reinventing itself by adapting to changing
circumstances and I am confident that it will
continue to do so. The current challenges of
development are plentiful, so there will be a
continuing need for research. The new dimensions to
the challenges brought about by the current context
of globalisation means that there will be room for
continuing innovation and adaptation. But for this
spirit of innovation to be complete, we must listen
more and more to endogenous voices and engage
them in ways that make our conversations less
incestuous and our methodologies less self-fulfilling.
This calls for learning on all sides to do things
differently; breaking barriers in order to build the kind
of comparative knowledge that draws from different
local contexts and knowledges and which might be
better adapted to the needs of both the state and
non-state policy communities that require such
knowledge. Only then might development research
become a powerful tool for social transformation.
